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Abstract
The aim of the work was to present the relationship between the development of social capital 
and corruption on the basis of new growth and knowledge management theories. Corruption 
was regarded in this work as a brake on the country’s productivity growth through its impact on 
the rate and quality of structural changes in an economy, and therefore its welfare. The article 
discussed possible damages caused by corruption to the efforts in the development of social 
capital, especially in public administration, which could include, for example, fall in different 
types of standards and mutual trust of social life participants. Based on the studies of inter-
national institutions as World Bank, World Economic Forum and Legatum Institute was also 
analyzed the relationship between selected indicators of corruption and social capital levels on 
a group of 104 countries by means of statistical methods in 2009–2010. The results confirmed 
the presence of co-dependence between an increase in social capital level and a decline of 
corruption scale in the surveyed countries.
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Introduction
In this paper the issue is continued, already considered in earlier studies of the 
author, which concerns the development of a knowledge-based economy. Social 
capital is regarded as an important component of a country’s soft environment, 
which determines the further increase in the welfare level of a knowledge-based 
economy. Social capital is meant to facilitate collective action, so that the public 
can continue long-term economic development. A knowledge-based economy 
should have a good quality social infrastructure, identified with soft environment 
that positively influences country’s productivity. It is all about stimulating coope-
ration institutions within the country and with its international environment, in 
other words, the development of social capital.
Corruption is detrimental for all types of enterprises and according to the 
World Bank Institute more than $1 trillion dollars (US$ 1,000 billion) are paid in 
bribes every year. Eliminating corruption within and between the public and pri-
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vate sectors has become one of the leading problems for businesses and govern-
ments as well as international organizations and institutions [UNIDO–UNODC, 
2007: 1–3].
The aim of this paper is to present the relationship between the development 
of social capital and corruption on the basis of new growth and knowledge man-
agement theories. Corruption is regarded in this work as a brake on the coun-
try’s productivity growth through its impact on the rate and quality of structural 
changes in an economy, and therefore its welfare. Corruption may in fact, inter 
alia, lead to a reduction in the level of cooperation and provide a barrier to es-
tablish, and subsequent strengthening of productive activities and relationships, 
which in the new growth theories means decreasing the rate of technological 
progress.
The first part of the work presents the notion of social capital, which is helpful 
in explaining the later choice of indicators used for its measurement. Then the 
possible impact of corruption on the dynamics and directions of social capital 
development is described. The second part of the paper focuses on the description 
of the methodological assumptions, the materials and the results of own research, 
which was conducted to identification the mutual interaction between corruption 
and social capital of a country. Based on the studies of international institutions 
as World Bank, World Economic Forum and Legatum Institute is analyzed the 
relationship between selected indicators of corruption scale and social capital 
level in the group of 104 surveyed countries by means of statistical methods in 
the years 2009–2010.
Impact of corruption on social capital development
Social capital is an element of intellectual capital. Intellectual capital researchers 
usually divide it into human capital, structural capital (or organizational), and 
just social capital, of which an important part is relation capital. Currently, we 
have a lot of definitions of social capital, as it is a complex and multidimensio-
nal phenomenon. However, many of these definitions refer to the understanding 
of social capital presented by established scholars of this issue Pierre Bourdieu, 
James Coleman and Robert Putnam. Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as 
the bonds and obligations based on reciprocity relations of human beings, which 
may be institutionalized in the form of social trust. R. Putman also defines so-
cial capital as connections between individuals, norms and trust that arise from 
these relationships and can increase the productivity of a society by facilitating 
the coordination of activities. For J. Coleman, social capital is primarily a social 
structure (network) made up of a variety of communities, which helps to achieve 
the objectives and benefits of their members. In other words, it is the ability of 
people to cooperate in achieving common goals.
The World Bank also defines social capital as part of the new program carried 
out by this institution entitled Social Capital Implementation Framework. Social 
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capital includes, according to specialists working for the World Bank, various 
institutions, linkages and relationships, norms and customs that determine the 
quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. Elements of social capital 
are the first networks, which are groups of individuals that promote development 
of personal relationships in order to improve welfare of all their members. Social 
networks are formed naturally or are created artificially, and include usually in-
dividuals with similar interests, personalities, knowledge and beliefs.
Second, such values as trust, solidarity, fairness and egalitarianism because 
they promote an increase in sense of unity and collective action, equality of treat-
ment and contribute to the fostering greater social inclusion and cohesion among 
members of the group. Therefore, many authors, like Adam B. Seligman, argue 
that trust ”is not rooting” in hierarchical cultures, based on the cult of the indi-
vidual and promoting elite thinking.
Third, information and communication technology (ICT) that task is to en-
sure the flow of and access to information. In this case this technology is primary 
intended to facilitate collaboration, foster the ability of people to work together 
without personal contact and increase the transparency of government policies, 
which should be aimed to develop a common good of the nation.
Fourth, the institutional sector constituting also different types of organiza-
tional structures, arrangements and solutions for cooperation between the private 
and public sectors. This cooperation may include identification and realization of 
common purposes, for example in the areas such as management and administra-
tive systems of the state and the future directions of employees’ education.
All the above definitions indicate that social capital includes the skills of co-
operation in order to implement efficiently common purposes of a given commu-
nity. In these definition strongly emphasis, that this cooperation requires the cre-
ation of various types of networks and the development of trust between human 
capital. A high level of social trust occurs in civil societies which are provided 
with capital in the form of actively and effectively functioning public and private 
organizations. Trust, as presented Francis Fukuyama, is existing belief in a given 
community that other members of that group are characterized by honesty and 
cooperative behavior based on shared values and principles.
It can be concluded that social capital determines the ability of a country to 
cooperate and work together, as, for example, affects the effectiveness of imple-
mented undertakings through the drop in transaction costs, reduces the scope of 
social exclusion, increases the degree of transparency (openness) and account-
ability of economic policy, including the wider access of enterprises and citi-
zens to information [Majewska, 2012: 205–206; Bumsub, 2010: 3–5, 8; Jantoń- 
-Drozdowska, Majewska-Bator, 2009: 312–313; Jankauskas, Šeputienė, 2007: 
132–133; Rothstein, Uslaner, 2005: 45–46; Przygodzki, 2004: 94–95, 98–101; 
Edvinsson, Malone, 2001: 17, 34–35; Johnson, 2000: 12–13; Fukuyama, 1997: 38; 
Seligman, 1997: 36–41; Coleman, 1988: 95; http:web.worldbank.org/topics/social 
development, September 2012].
When examining the relationship between the corruption scale and develop-
ment of social capital is frequently analyzed the quality of institutional arrange-
Maria Majewska256
ments under which citizens of a given country live, work and doing business. It 
puts the emphasis on the fact that social capital’s growth depends on how many 
members of the community are willing to sacrifice individual interests in order to 
realize a common good. In the words of J. Coleman is needed an adequate level 
of trust among members of a given community and readiness to sacrifice their 
individual aims for the collective good. So the point is whether various repre-
sentatives of the state are able to place the public interest above self-interest that 
means not succumb to corruption. Otherwise, working in institutions designed 
to multiply the public good, they are guided in deciding their selfish objective 
function. The problem is concerned, for example, by representatives of public 
choice theory.
As shown not only the specialists working for the World Bank effective man-
agement, commitment to increase the prosperity of citizens and protection of 
their rights, fair and accountable institutions and appropriate rules of law, all 
supporting economic development. Robert Putnam believes that societies with 
a tendency to trust and cooperation, and having common goals are more effective 
and valuable. Such kind of a society is also characterized by smaller corruption 
scale, and therefore a higher degree of honesty in mutual relations.
Citizens must indeed trust officials and politicians that respect established 
law and represent their interests and believe that they have sufficient knowledge 
and competence to make decisions about the future of a society, which is identi-
fied with social capital developed in relations between government officials and 
other citizens. Then support changes proposed by government and engage more 
in their implementation and are increasingly convinced that can have an impact 
on state management. In these conditions may come to cooperation between the 
public and private sector, what is useful because the private sector is equipped 
with larger practical knowledge resources (e.g. know-how). This situation reduc-
es the waste of public funds and increases the efficiency of jointly-implemented 
projects. The need for cooperation between the public and private sector on issues 
related to the country’s development and effective budget revenue allocation, is 
especially strongly emphasized by representatives of new growth theory, in par-
ticular Paul Romer.
Otherwise the situation may look in the case of too strongly developed social 
capital that connects various personal relationships of government officials and 
politicians. However, it depends on their value system and the reasons for which 
they got into power. They can in fact work together to protect their own interests, 
and the concept of social welfare is alien to them. This type of social network 
members also show little willingness to cooperate with external environment, 
what is closely related to preference for nepotism and favoring family members, 
friends, or persons whose activities may benefit a given interest group.
Then this type of social capital fosters the intensification of corruption, 
which lowers public sector efficiency and contributes to socioeconomic inequal-
ity growth. That is, inter alia, confirmed by the results of Bo Rothstein and Eric 
M. Uslaner, Donna Harris, Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama. In this case, 
corruption is firstly driven by the need of or compulsion to loyalty towards the 
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members of such community, rather than loyalty to a society understood as ex-
ternal environment of this network. Secondly, by the necessity to reciprocate ser-
vices. In this situation may appear the going outside relationship: patron/principal- 
-agent-client. The corrupt leaders reward those individuals who show them loy-
alty. A patron can be, for example, a minister, an agent a bureaucrat deciding to 
take a bribe, and a client a company or an interest group represented by a lobbyist.
In such interconnections and relations system follows the transfer of public 
resources to privileged interest groups. The consequence is usually a decrease 
in productivity (e.g. due to an increase in transaction costs) and slowing down 
the economic development rate. It also increases incomes inequality, and a large 
scale of this phenomenon can lead to social conflicts, and first a trust fall in the 
so-called elites, and later also in other members of a society. In addition, citizens 
no longer trust institutions of the state and think they are not equal before the 
law. According to the analyses presented by Aleksandar Stulhofer in his work, 
the level of trust in institutions of the state depends on age (younger members of 
a society are less trusting), education (better educated people are less trusting) 
and place of residence (citizens living in large communities are less trusting).
Moreover corrupt governments stealing a society usually lower wages in the 
public sector, especially serial officials. This may be a factor increasing corruption 
at lower levels of state governance on the principle that “example comes from the 
top,” and “honesty does not pay”. Citizens are beginning to believe that without 
knowing the right people and money nothing can be simply and honestly get it.
Finally, the growing conviction that widespread corruption and the fact that 
wealthy citizens have gained their properties not through honest and hard work 
will foster demands to redistribute income from the rich to the poor parts of a so-
ciety, for example in the form of higher tax burdens. It should be stressed at this 
point that more and more often in the literature appears the idea that the proper in-
come redistribution can reduce corruption. It is related to the relationship between 
economic development and corruption scale, because wealthier societies are char-
acterized by lower levels of incomes inequality, and their welfare is already higher. 
Under such conditions, determinants of corrupt behavior are losing their strength 
[Majewska, 2012: 205; The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012: 4; Harris, 
2007: 2–5; Rothstein, Uslaner, 2005: 41–43, 50–55; Štulhofer, 2004: 80, 83–84; 
Bjørnskov, 2003: 2–4; Svendsen, 2003: 6–7; Putman, 2000; Fukuyama, 1997; http: 
web.worldbank.org/topics/social development, September 2012].
Methodology, material and research results  
on the relationship between social capital level  
and corruption scale
The study covered a group of 104 countries included in the rankings of World 
Bank, World Economic Forum and Legatum Institute. As a research period ad-
opted the years 2009–2010, because for them it was possible obtained the latest 
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overview of all selected indicators for the analysis of social capital and corrup-
tion. Due to the comparison of data from different sources, it was decided to 
make a compilation of the positions occupied by a given country of concerned 
rankings. This is the procedure recommended in this situation, and does not re-
quire a normalization of the data before performing the statistical analysis.
As synthetic (aggregate) index of corruption in a given country is selected 
the Control of Corruption Index of the World Bank, because it takes into ac-
count a larger number of countries than the other very often used in the research 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International 
the global civil society organization to fight against corruption. Transparency 
International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
In addition, the World Bank’s index covers a broader range of corrupt behaviors 
than the index of Transparency International. In this case, a given country posi-
tion in the ranking are set up on the percentile scale reported by the World Bank. 
However in the situation that concerned countries obtained the same number of 
points their positions were adjusted by using the estimated value of corruption 
by the World Bank, ranging from 2,5 to –2,5. It was decided also to take into 
account two situations classified as corrupt behaviors. There is diversion of pub-
lic funds to companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption, and irregular 
payments and bribes connected with (a) imports and exports, (b) public utilities, 
(c) annual tax payments, (d) awarding of public contracts and licenses, (e) ob-
taining favorable judicial decisions. The source of those indices was the study 
published by the World Economic Forum entitled The Global Competitiveness 
Report [The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012, World Economic Forum, 
Geneva 2011; www.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_details, September 2012; http://
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi, September 2012].
To estimate the social capital level chosen a synthetic indicator published by 
the independent British research center Legatum Institute. It is a part of the ag-
gregate indicator of economic prosperity and quality of life. The Legatum Social 
Capital Index measures countries’ performances in two areas: social cohesion 
and engagement, as well as community and family networks. According to spe-
cialists working for the Legatum Institute social networks and the cohesion that 
a society experiences when people trust one another have a direct effect on the 
prosperity of a country. This social capital index assesses how factors like volun-
teering, helping strangers, and donating to charitable organizations influence the 
economic and life satisfaction of the populace as a whole. The index also evalu-
ates the levels of trust in a society and the manner in which citizens believe they 
can rely on others, and it assesses how marriage and religiosity provide support 
networks that improve wellbeing. Therefore the Legatum Social Capital Index 
takes into account such factors as donation, formal volunteering, helping strang-
ers, number of marriages, perception of social support, religious attendance, and 
trust others [http://www.prosperity.com/social.aspx, September 2012].
Also was created own weighted aggregate social capital index based on indi-
cators published in The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011. It takes into 
account the following components of social capital: public trust in the ethical 
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standards of politicians, transparency of government policymaking affecting 
business activities, cooperation in labor-employer relations, university-industry 
collaboration in research and development (R & D) and state of cluster develop-
ment. Each component of own index of social capital assigned a weighting 0,2, 
which means that it is a symmetrical weighted aggregate index. Countries were 
ranked according to the calculated total values of social capital index. In own 
social capital index intentionally puts more emphasis on the issues associated 
with cooperation in business. It can be thus concluded that the two indexes of 
social capital included in the study are mutually complementary. It is worth con-
structing synthetic indicators select variables describing different aspects of the 
analyzed phenomenon.
In table 1 are presented the positions of researched countries obtained in con-
sidered rankings of indexes and indices of social capital level and corruption 
scale for the years 2009–2010. First place achieved by a country in all selected 
rankings means or the smallest scale of corruption, or the highest social capital 
level in comparison to the rest of the researched economies. For example, Poland 
obtained the best position in the case of the Legatum Institute ranking of social 
capital, and the worst for the indices of transparency of government policymak-
ing affecting business activities and state of cluster development. This explains 
much lower position of Poland in the second social capital ranking that takes into 
account a greater extent of the issues connecting with the development of coop-
eration by a country.
Table 1
Countries’ positions in different social capital and corruption rankings in 2009–2010
Country
Social capital Corruption
LSCI OSCI UIC CLER SCD TGPB PTP WBCCI DPF IPB
Algeria 70 95 96 68 100 94 60 94 50 79
Argentina 22 93 46 100 53 99 103 56 23 22
Australia 4 17 13 33 31 17 14 89 99 87
Austria 15 13 17 10 19 15 19 12 11 15
Bangladesh 103 85 101 63 46 80 84 14 15 16
Belgium 19 28 10 49 23 45 35 91 81 103
Bolivia 74 102 100 93 92 101 80 21 25 21
Botswana 56 34 59 37 90 22 15 90 90 92
Brazil 51 46 31 66 20 68 94 44 26 31
Bulgaria 75 98 89 84 93 100 75 56 91 54
Cambodia 92 59 94 58 44 97 36 37 77 76
Cameroon 97 99 92 72 102 90 72 15 28 20
Canada 8 11 7 21 11 10 17 71 40 47
Chile 60 25 36 31 33 9 24 39 68 63
China 25 22 24 43 15 29 16 20 78 51
Country
Social capital Corruption
LSCI OSCI UIC CLER SCD TGPB PTP WBCCI DPF IPB
Colombia 58 42 42 35 35 43 70 1 4 5
Costa Rica 43 27 26 11 45 41 30 67 100 78
Croatia 39 89 64 101 85 54 69 66 62 48
Czech Republic 30 47 27 39 36 76 89 95 98 81
Denmark 2 5 8 8 18 8 8 46 54 57
Dominican Republic 61 63 77 32 54 44 93 46 21 17
Ecuador 91 101 98 92 91 85 91 17 30 25
Egypt 90 52 97 73 56 51 29 92 39 70
El Salvador 98 62 93 22 68 57 71 73 101 98
Estonia 41 31 33 29 78 13 39 3 5 4
Ethiopia 80 77 83 77 95 75 42 19 20 24
Finland 7 4 3 13 9 7 10 59 51 74
France 40 33 40 97 27 24 22 36 71 71
Germany 16 12 9 16 12 12 20 65 96 68
Ghana 96 68 81 46 76 74 49 23 37 32
Greece 95 94 91 95 80 69 66 5 9 12
Guatemala 45 43 47 24 37 35 98 70 84 82
Honduras 76 72 76 54 65 66 63 2 7 8
Hong Kong 21 7 25 6 7 2 13 80 53 66
Hungary 52 74 29 55 82 72 95 78 44 77
Iceland 14 20 15 4 51 14 32 97 46 52
India 99 40 50 38 26 33 62 10 18 13
Indonesia 42 32 35 36 21 71 38 31 16 6
Iran 100 67 80 88 77 96 28 22 19 14
Ireland 10 26 16 28 28 21 48 52 58 62
Israel 17 29 14 19 58 70 27 28 22 10
Italy 28 50 60 91 1 92 81 54 31 36
Jamaica 47 75 56 86 67 47 78 81 66 96
Japan 29 18 18 7 2 37 44 87 92 95
Jordan 78 49 82 61 62 40 31 9 14 11
Kazakhstan 31 60 90 62 72 58 34 77 73 75
Kenya 73 66 48 60 38 83 96 63 95 102
Korea Republic 55 58 22 103 22 84 76 53 80 72
Kuwait 26 48 79 34 50 91 33 29 41 39
Latvia 87 78 62 52 84 60 87 40 36 40
Libya 93 84 88 47 66 78 102 57 42 41
Lithuania 46 55 32 51 86 34 79 30 59 58
Macedonia 81 64 63 59 88 63 50 60 88 90
Malaysia 85 21 21 14 14 28 25 28 52 38
Mali 53 83 75 82 79 61 68 51 43 43
Mexico 35 53 51 56 43 62 67 38 35 42
Country
Social capital Corruption
LSCI OSCI UIC CLER SCD TGPB PTP WBCCI DPF IPB
Moldova 71 90 99 78 104 50 55 83 82 104
Mongolia 24 96 73 65 101 93 86 62 47 65
Morocco 13 65 86 90 60 59 45 50 74 73
Mozambique 88 57 43 85 81 49 47 64 72 80
Namibia 66 41 68 80 69 30 21 72 93 91
Nepal 79 97 103 102 73 73 97 79 87 67
Netherlands 5 8 11 9 17 16 11 58 33 35
New Zealand 3 9 20 12 49 3 3 88 85 100
Nicaragua 82 88 95 50 75 89 82 13 12 18
Nigeria 84 87 84 83 41 98 92 87 94 93
Norway 1 6 19 3 16 11 4 75 89 84
Pakistan 104 69 69 76 39 88 64 16 8 7
Panama 36 51 71 44 40 38 73 6 1 1
Paraguay 57 100 102 79 96 82 100 85 69 89
Peru 94 70 78 41 64 42 88 48 55 61
Philippines 77 80 72 42 48 95 101 76 104 101
Poland 23 79 54 64 89 86 57 42 65 50
Portugal 59 37 28 70 47 55 43 27 32 34
Romania 89 103 85 96 94 104 85 33 34 28
Russian Federation 49 71 52 87 74 79 51 78 83 85
Rwanda 101 23 55 18 57 19 6 45 61 37
Saudi Arabia 18 16 30 23 24 31 7 35 63 44
Senegal 63 81 45 71 97 77 77 68 13 23
Singapore 50 1 6 1 5 1 1 74 75 69
Slovak Republic 38 73 74 40 55 65 99 4 3 3
Slovenia 37 35 34 67 42 20 52 26 86 55
South Africa 67 39 23 99 34 23 61 34 38 29
Spain 34 44 41 75 32 53 54 69 45 46
Sri Lanka 27 45 44 48 29 81 53 18 27 33
Sweden 11 3 5 5 8 5 2 93 70 88
Switzerland 6 2 2 2 4 4 9 11 6 9
Syria 72 91 104 69 83 102 37 8 2 2
Taiwan 48 10 12 17 3 6 26 55 48 53
Tanzania 54 56 66 74 59 67 46 24 29 30
Thailand 20 36 37 27 30 46 58 82 64 86
Trinidad and Tobago 68 82 58 94 71 64 74 41 60 49
Tunisia 64 24 37 25 63 18 12 61 17 27
Turkey 102 61 70 89 52 39 56 49 56 59
Uganda 62 76 67 45 98 52 65 65 102 94
Ukraine 69 92 61 81 87 87 90 84 97 97
United Arab Emirates 33 14 39 15 25 27 5 47 24 26
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Table 2 presents the results of the research obtained from estimating 
Spearman’s rank correlation between considered in this analysis indexes and 
indices of social capital and corruption for a group of 104 selected countries 
in the years 2009–2010. All correlation coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant on the level 0,05. The values of correlation coefficients show that the 
higher position of a given country according to the level of social capital, the 
better place in the considered rankings of corruption. In other words, the above 
given relationship between an increase in social capital and a smaller scale of 
corruption has been confirmed by Spearman’s rank correlation. Therefore, in 
the situation when coefficients are positive and statistically significant, we can 
affirm that social capital development is accompanied by a decrease in the scale 
of corruption and vice versa. The above relationship between an increase in the 
social capital level and a decline of the scale of corruption can result from this 
that countries with well-developed social capital are also economies with higher 
levels of welfare, and one of the best effective methods to fight against corruption 
is economic development.
Using the method of linear regression was carried out the analysis for the re-
lationship between the aggregate indexes of social capital and corruption in order 
to verify that is a two-way relation, and whether there are differences in strength 
of dependence the corruption scale on the social capital level in comparison to 
dependence the social capital level on the corruption scale. The bidirectional rela-
tionship between the change of corruption and social capital levels has been con-
firmed by statistical significant regression coefficients presented in table 3. The 
regression analysis results also suggest that the impact of decrease in corruption 
on development of social capital may be stronger than the impact of social capital 
increase on reducing corruption scale.
Country
Social capital Corruption
LSCI OSCI UIC CLER SCD TGPB PTP WBCCI DPF IPB
United Kingdom 9 19 4 20 10 26 41 96 103 99
United States 12 15 1 26 6 32 40 25 76 45
Uruguay 32 38 49 98 70 25 18 7 10 19
Venezuela 44 104 65 104 103 103 104 86 49 83
Vietnam 65 30 53 30 13 56 23 32 57 56
Zambia 86 54 57 53 61 36 59 83 67 64
Zimbabwe 83 86 87 57 99 48 83 98 79 60
Legend: LSCI – Legatum Social Capital Index, OSCI – Own Social Capital Index, UIC – 
university-industry collaboration in R & D, CLER – cooperation in labor-employer relations, 
SCD – state of cluster development, TGPB – transparency of government policymaking affec-
ting business activities, PTP – public trust of politicians, WBCCI – World Bank Corruption 
Control Index, DPF – diversion of public funds, IPB – irregular payments and bribes.
Source: own calculation on the base of following data: The Global Competitiveness Report 
2010–2011: 368, 369, 370, 377, 444, 480, 491, 444; http://www.prosperity.com/social.aspx, 
September 2012; http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp, September 
2012. 
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Table 2 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients across various indexes of social capital  
and corruption for a group of 104 researched countries in 2009–2010
Corruption
Social capital
LSCI OSCI UIC CLER SCD TGPB PTP
WBCCI 0,61 0,67 0,73 0,53 0,53 0.65 0,44
DPF 0,54 0,84 0,68 0,59 0,56 0.73 0,87
IPB 0,59 0,83 0,76 0,59 0,55 0.77 0,72
Note: all coefficients statistically significant on the level 0,05.
Source: own calculation on the base of data from table 1.
Table 3 
Results of linear regression analysis across the composite indexes of social capital  
and corruption for a group of 104 researched countries
n = 104 Regression coefficient Constant R2 F p-value
Independent variable WBCCI – independent variable
LSCI 0,573* 20,415* 0,373 60,782 0,000
OSCI 0,631* 17,362* 0,453 84,486 0,000
Dependent variable WBCCI – independent variable
LSCI 0,652* 19,59* 0,373 60,782 0,000
OSCI 0,718* 16,249* 0,453 84,486 0,000
Note: *statistically significant coefficient on the level 0,05.
Source: own calculation on the base of data from table 1.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this study was to explain the relationship between the level of social 
capital and the spread of corruption and verify by empirical studies the presence 
of statistically significant relationship between these phenomena, described in 
the literature of the subject.
Overview of the impact of corrupt behavior on the social capital level and 
the results of the own research confirm that they are phenomena whose develop-
ment is linked together and connected cause and effect relationship. This is due 
to, inter alia, the fact that in both cases is important value system of citizens and 
representatives of the state, the quality and effectiveness of various government 
institutions, the reasons for choosing the road of life, which is the management 
of the state, the sense of responsibility of politicians and other members of a so-
ciety for the development of social good, the attitude towards observance of the 
law of all members of a society. Therefore, development economics emphasizes 
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the need for competent government, which is not alien to the concept of social 
welfare, taking care that all citizens can live better, also through wise and proper 
income redistribution in order to reduce inequalities between the welfare levels 
of state citizens.
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